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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs are a class of past, present, and future insulin- 
dependent diabetic inmates ("plaintiffs") whofiled suit 
claiming that various corrections officials and employees 
were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' serious 
medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In 
this appeal, defendants challenge the District Court's 
refusal to grant summary judgment in their favor on the 
grounds of qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed 
below, we vacate the District Court's decision and remand 
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
In 1990, Darryl Rouse, an insulin-dependent diabetic 
then incarcerated at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment 
Center ("ADTC"), a correctional facility in New Jersey, filed 
this S 1983 action. Named as defendants were: William 
Fauver, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections; William Plantier, Acting Superintendent of the 
ADTC; Doctor Robert Cardinale, former Medical Director of 
ADTC; Doctor Narshima Reddy, former physician at ADTC; 
and Nurse Elaine Allen, former Chief of Nursing at ADTC. 
Rouse alleged that the defendants had subjected him to 
cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide him 
with adequate medical care. 
 
In 1994, Rouse amended his complaint and sought class 
certification, declaratory and injunctive relief for the class 
members, and monetary relief for present insulin- 
dependent diabetic inmates. See Supp. App. at 18-19 
(Amended Complaint).1 The amended complaint alleged that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had 
impermissibly discriminated against insulin-dependent diabetics because 
of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 
U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. The District Court denied defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the merits of this claim, see Rouse v. Plantier, 
997 F. Supp. 575, 582 (D.N.J. 1998), but granted their motion on the 
basis of qualified immunity, Rouse v. Plantier, 987 F. Supp. 302, 317 
(D.N.J. 1997). This issue is not on appeal. 
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"[t]he defendants have provided class members with 
medical care for their diabetes and diabetes-related 
conditions that is so uniformly and grossly inadequate as to 
constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." See Id. at 18. 
 
In 1996, the District Court certified a class consisting of 
all former, present, and future insulin-dependent diabetics 
incarcerated at the ADTC, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). For the purpose of classwide 
damages, the District Court also certified a class consisting 
of all former and present insulin-dependent diabetics 
incarcerated at the ADTC, pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 
 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits 
of plaintiffs' claim and, alternatively, on the grounds of 
qualified immunity. In support of their respective 
arguments, both parties submitted the reports of medical 
experts. None of the experts disputed that plaintiffs suffer 
from insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, which all agree is 
a serious illness. 
 
Plaintiffs proffered an expert report by Dr. Michael D. 
Cohen. See App. at 123-46. Basing his report primarily on 
the American Diabetes Association Clinical Practice 
Recommendations issued in 1995, Dr. Cohen explained 
that a characteristic of insulin-dependent diabetes is an 
abnormally high amount of sugar in the blood due to 
insulin deficiency, see id. at 123, and that a primary goal 
of disease management, therefore, is to lower the amount of 
sugar in the blood to normal or near-normal physiological 
levels. See Id. at 125. Achieving this goal, Dr. Cohen stated, 
requires diabetics to engage in a comprehensive daily care 
plan. See Id. at 123 ("Daily management requires close 
attention to medication, dietary intake and activity, with 
frequent monitoring of the blood sugar."). Failure to do so, 
Dr. Cohen asserted, can cause short-term complications, 
including excessive urination, constant thirst and hunger, 
weakness, confusion, dizziness, and seizures, as well as 
severe long-term problems, including blindness, 
amputation of feet and legs, renal failure, and nerve 
damage. See Id. 
 
                                4 
  
Dr. Cohen noted several components necessary for 
proper diabetes management. First, he said, diabetics 
require daily injections of insulin, the frequency of which 
depends upon the severity of the illness. See Id. at 125-26. 
Second, he asserted that in order to determine the amount 
of insulin required, diabetics must monitor their blood- 
sugar levels at least three to four times each day. See Id. at 
126; see also id. at 155 (Report of Plaintiffs' Expert, Dr. 
Mathew J. Miller) ("Dr. Miller's report") (asserting that "all 
insulin-requiring diabetics should monitor their blood 
glucose levels on a daily basis" and that the ability to test 
one's blood-sugar level three to four times each day"is a 
reasonable standard to which we should aspire"). Third, he 
stated that, in addition to snacks and low-sugar sweets, 
diabetics must be given individualized diet plans tailored to 
their specific medical needs. See Id. at 127-30; see also Id. 
at 156 (Dr. Miller's Report) ("Appropriate food should be 
provided to each diabetic, the portions and composition 
individualized to needs, size, activity level and so forth."). 
Fourth, Dr. Cohen opined that diabetics must be educated 
about their disease and the steps necessary to maintain 
their health. See Id. at 130; see also id. at 155 (Dr. Miller's 
Report) ("[E]ducation is the sine qua non of good diabetic 
management."). Fifth, Dr. Cohen stated that timely and 
effective measures must be taken to prevent long-term and 
chronic complications, such as blindness and loss of limbs. 
See Id. at 131-39. For instance, Dr. Cohen noted that the 
American Diabetes Association recommends an "[a]nnual 
comprehensive dilated eye and vision examination by an 
opthamologist." See Id. at 134. And finally, he stated, 
clinical and follow-up evaluations must be conducted on a 
regular basis to monitor the progression of the diabetic's 
illness. See Id. at 139-46; id. at 139 ("Special primary care 
needs of diabetics include: comprehensive initial evaluation, 
regular followup, access to aggressive care for acute 
illnesses and injuries, attention to prevention of lung 
infections[,] and dental care."). 
 
Dr. Cohen evaluated the level of care provided to the 
plaintiffs and opined that the defendants had failed to treat 
plaintiffs' illness adequately in all material respects. See Id. 
at 146 ("Essential components of necessary care for 
prisoners with diabetes are missing or inadequate at 
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ADTC."). Dr. Cohen faulted defendants for giving plaintiffs 
one insulin shot per day, despite suggestions from medical 
consultants that some of the plaintiffs required more than 
one daily injection. See Id. at 126. Dr. Cohen noted that 
plaintiffs were not provided the opportunity to monitor their 
blood-sugar levels on a daily basis and that, in some cases, 
blood sugar levels had been tested only 20 times per year. 
See Id. at 125-27. In addition, Dr. Cohen stated that, 
among other deficiencies, defendants had not provided 
plaintiffs with individualized meals and had not furnished 
diabetes-appropriate snacks or low-sugar sweets. See Id. at 
128-30. Dr. Cohen noted further that, other than 
scheduling one education session several years ago, the 
defendants had not educated the plaintiffs about their 
illness. See Id. at 130. Last, Dr. Cohen asserted that 
defendants had no comprehensive plan for preventing long- 
term complications (e.g., inmates are not permitted to visit 
an eye doctor annually), see id. at 134-35, and that the 
defendants had not established an adequate evaluation and 
follow-up program to monitor the progression of the 
inmates' illness. See Id. at 139-46. He concluded: 
 
       The care and treatment provided to prisoners with 
       diabetes at ADTC is unacceptable by current standards 
       of care. . . . As medical and nursing staff at ADTC are 
       or ought to be aware of the current standards of care 
       for management of diabetes and the harm that results 
       from inadequate care and treatment, they have shown 
       deliberate indifference to the pain and suffering of 
       prisoners with diabetes. 
 
App. at 124-25. 
 
In response, defendants commissioned a report from Dr. 
William E. Ryan. Id. at 158-74. Dr. Ryan agreed with 
plaintiffs' expert that diabetes care must be 
"individualized," but he disputed most of Dr. Cohen's other 
assertions. See Id. at 163. Dr. Ryan noted that diabetics 
whose blood-sugar levels are "known" and "stable" do not 
require daily glucose testing. Id. Such testing, he asserted, 
is only "designed for acute and new diabetics." Id. He noted 
that the plaintiffs' blood-sugar levels generally had 
remained constant and within normal ranges, i.e, "between 
125 and 140mg," but he recognized that "many of the 
 
                                6 
  
glucose values were in excess of 200mg, which is less than 
hoped for and certainly not ideal." Id. at 164. He placed the 
blame for the increased levels on the plaintiffs, who 
according to Dr. Ryan, had been "uninformed regarding 
their diabetic management when they entered the 
institution" and had "thwarted" the staff's efforts to control 
blood-sugar levels by not complying with their prescribed 
diets. Id. at 161, 164. Dr. Ryan further asserted that, 
because each patient at a minimum saw a doctor every 
three months, the care provided at ADTC was "entirely 
appropriate" under clinical recommendations. See Id. at 
163 ("[R]egular visits (diabetic) should be scheduled for 
insulin treated patients at least quarterly . . . . More 
frequent contact may also be required if the patient is 
undergoing extensive insulin therapy . . . ."). Finally, Dr. 
Ryan cited several specific instances in which some of the 
plaintiffs had received timely and effective medical 
treatment. See Id. (explaining that Rouse had received 
prompt medical treatment when his blood-sugar level 
increased to an unacceptable level). In sum, he found "no 
evidence of deliberate indifference or insensitivity by the 
staff of ADTC in the care of their inmate diabetic patient 
population." Id. at 170. 
 
Considering the experts' reports, the District Court 
granted summary judgment to Commissioner Fauver on the 
merits of the Eighth Amendment claim and dismissed as 
moot the summary judgment motion on the grounds of 
qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate Fauver's culpability. See Rouse v. Plantier, 987 
F. Supp. 302, 312, 315 n.13 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Rouse I"); id. 
at 312 ("Plaintiffs have not adequately responded to 
Defendants' contention that there is no evidence of 
Defendant Fauver's deliberate indifference."). With respect 
to the remaining defendants, however, the District Court 
denied summary judgment on both grounds. See Id. at 312, 
315; Rouse v. Plantier, 997 F. Supp. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1998) 
("Rouse II"). 
 
The District Court first held that plaintiffs had 
demonstrated the existence of material factual issues on 
whether the plaintiffs as a class had received 
constitutionally adequate medical care and constitutionally 
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appropriate diabetes meals. See Rouse I, 987 F. Supp. at 
308-12. The District Court next found that plaintiffs had 
adduced sufficient evidence for summary judgment 
purposes that the defendants had been aware of the risks 
of such inadequacy but had disregarded them. See Id. at 
312. Turning to defendants' qualified immunity defense, the 
District Court held that the right at issue was clearly 
established and that the defendants had failed to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of their actions. See Id. at 
313 n.10, 314-15; see also Rouse II, 997 F. Supp. at 579- 
80. Accordingly, it refused to grant summary judgment in 
their favor. 
 
Defendants moved for reconsideration, and the District 
Court again rejected their qualified immunity defense. See 
Rouse II, 997 F. Supp. at 579-80. Defendants then took 
this appeal. They challenge only the District Court's 
determination that they are not entitled to qualified 
immunity on plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, see 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), and our review is 
plenary, see Larsen v. Senate of Cmwlth. of Pa., 154 F.3d 
82, 87 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1037 (1999). 
 
II. 
 
The only issue in this appeal is whether the defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity. Under this doctrine, "government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "The 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640 (1987); see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 616 
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). In determining whether defendants 
are entitled to claim qualified immunity, we engage in a 
three-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiffs alleged a 
violation of their constitutional rights; (2) whether the right 
alleged to have been violated was clearly established in the 
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existing law at the time of the violation; and (3) whether a 
reasonable official knew or should have known that the 
alleged action violated the plaintiffs' rights. 
 
A. We now turn to whether the plaintiffs alleged a 
violation of their constitutional rights. The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of "unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary 
standards of decency." See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 
25, 32 (1993). In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires 
prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those 
whom it has incarcerated. The Court articulated the 
standard to be used: 
 
       In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must 
       allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 
       evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical 
       needs. It is only such indifference that can offend 
       "evolving standards of decency" in violation of the 
       Eighth Amendment. 
 
Id. at 106. Therefore, to succeed under these principles, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to their medical needs and (2) that 
those needs were serious. Id. The defendants agree that 
insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus is a serious illness, and 
therefore only the former question is in issue here. 
 
It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical 
malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do 
not constitute "deliberate indifference." As the Estelle Court 
noted: "[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to 
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute 
`an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be 
`repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' " Id. at 105; see 
also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("[T]he law is clear that simple medical malpractice is 
insufficient to present a constitutional violation."); White v. 
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis 
omitted) ("[C]ertainly no claim is stated when a doctor 
disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor. 
There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat 
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an illness."). "Deliberate indifference," therefore, requires 
"obduracy and wantonness," Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 319 (1986), which has been likened to conduct that 
includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious 
risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) 
(stating that "it is enough that the official acted or failed to 
act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 
harm"). 
 
We have found "deliberate indifference" in a variety of 
circumstances, including where the prison official (1) knows 
of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally 
refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment 
based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner 
from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment. 
See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68 (citing Monmouth County Corr. 
Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)). We also have 
found "deliberate indifference" to exist where the prison 
official persists in a particular course of treatment "in the 
face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury." 
Napoleon, 897 F.2d at 109-11 (holding that allegations of 
several instances of flawed medical treatment state a claim 
under Eighth Amendment). 
 
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiffs had alleged 
a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the District 
Court relied on the experts' reports submitted by the 
parties. The Court first found that genuine issues of 
material fact existed on whether the plaintiffs were "served 
a meal appropriate for their diabetic condition." Rouse I, 
987 F. Supp. at 308. The Court noted the "numerous 
deficiencies" cited by plaintiffs' expert, including (1) lack of 
portion control, (2) unavailability of diabetes-appropriate 
meals, snacks, and low-sugar foods, and (3) failure to 
individualize diets. Id. Next, the Court found that genuine 
issues of material fact existed on whether the level of care 
provided to plaintiffs was constitutionally adequate. Id. at 
310. Observing that some of the plaintiffs had their blood- 
sugar levels tested only a minimal number of times each 
year, the Court refused to conclude, as a matter of law, that 
defendants had provided appropriate medical care. Id. at 
311-12. Noting several additional deficiencies, 2 the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Specifically, the District Court noted that genuine issues of fact 
existed on "1) the adequacy of care of Rouse and Brooks' feet; 2) the 
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Court concluded that "the risks of inadequate treatment 
were obvious to a reasonably well-trained doctor, nurse, or 
prison official" and that the defendants "were subjectively 
aware of the risks . . . but did not respond reasonably." Id. 
at 312. 
 
On appeal, defendants contend that the evidence 
demonstrates that plaintiffs were provided with"extensive 
care" that did not "fall short of that required by the Eighth 
Amendment." Appellants' Br. at 41, 37. Specifically, 
defendants note that not "all" insulin-dependent diabetics 
require "routine daily blood-sugar testing." Id. at 33 
(emphasis in original). They point to a lack of evidence 
indicating that the number of blood-sugar tests performed 
each year and the diabetic meals provided each patient 
were inappropriate for any of the particular plaintiffs' 
diabetic condition. See Id. at 34, 37 ("[P]laintiffs cannot 
demonstrate . . . that . . . the frequency of sugar testing for 
their particular medical condition so threatened their 
health [that it] subjected them to cruel and unusual 
punishment. . . . Plaintiffs [also] have presented absolutely 
no evidence that they cannot maintain their health based 
on [the] diets [provided]."). 
 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the 
defendants' systemic failure to provide a constitutionally 
adequate level of care reflected a deliberate indifference to 
the plaintiffs' serious medical needs. See Appellees' Br. at 
16. Such failure, they maintain, is evidenced by the 
defendants' refusal to provide a level of care even 
approximating that required by accepted medical practices. 
See Id. They further contend that "only an official who was 
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of 
diabetic inmates could have participated in, and not 
objected to, the constitutionally deficient system of diabetic 
care at ADTC." Id. at 23-24. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
adequacy of the eye care provided, particularly, whether any preventive 
care is provided; 3) the adequacy of measures to prevent other relatively 
common diabetes-specific complications, such as kidney damage, nerve 
damage, or blood vessel damage; 4) the existence of and need for diabetic 
education." Rouse I, 987 F. Supp. at 311 (citations omitted). 
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Considering the principles enunciated in Estelle  and its 
progeny, we find that the District Court erred in concluding 
on a wholesale basis that the plaintiffs alleged a violation of 
their Eighth Amendment rights. The experts' reports make 
clear that not all insulin-dependent diabetics require the 
same level of medical care. The reports show that there are 
at least two groups of insulin-dependent diabetic plaintiffs 
in this case. The first group consists of those insulin- 
dependent diabetics whose blood sugar levels consistently 
fluctuate to abnormal levels (i.e., the "unstable" plaintiffs). 
These diabetics require intensive medical treatment in order 
to regulate their blood sugar levels to normal or near 
normal physiological levels, which, as the experts' reports 
demonstrate, is the primary goal of diabetes management. 
The other group is comprised of those insulin-dependent 
diabetics whose blood sugar levels remain at or near 
normal physiological levels over time (i.e., the"stable" 
plaintiffs). These individuals have already achieved the 
primary goal of diabetes management and therefore do not 
require the same level of intensive medical treatment as 
their unstable counterparts. Consequently, it is possible 
that conduct that violates the Eighth Amendment rights of 
the unstable plaintiffs may not violate the constitutional 
rights of the stable plaintiffs. 
 
In light of the diverse medical needs of, and the different 
level of care owed to, each group of plaintiffs, the District 
Court erred in holding that all members of the plaintiff 
class alleged a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. 
Based on the evidence in the summary judgment record, 
there may be one or more subgroups of plaintiffs as to 
whom particular aspects of the care allegedly provided was 
not consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements and 
other subgroups as to whom particular aspects of the care 
was constitutionally adequate. On remand, therefore, the 
Court should address the specific needs of each such 
group, considering, for instance, the appropriate amount of 
glucose testing, the need for a special diet, and the 
plaintiffs' general compliance with their medical 
appointments and prescribed dietary plans. Then, the 
District Court should consider the appropriate level of care 
due under the Eighth Amendment. Only after the latter 
determinations are made should the District Court 
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determine whether the defendants' actions with respect to 
each of these matters and with respect to each relevant 
subgroup of plaintiffs were consistent with the requisite 
level of care owed under the Eighth Amendment at the 
times in question. 
 
We note that this case presents an unusual situation-- 
an Eighth Amendment class action for damages in which 
the defendants asserted the defense of qualified immunity 
-- and that prior circuit precedent did not provide the 
District Court with guidance as to how the defendant's 
qualified immunity claim should be handled in this context. 
The constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff class -- the 
Eighth Amendment right of a prisoner to be free from 
deliberate indifference to his or her serious medical needs 
-- is one that obviously varies depending on the medical 
needs of the particular prisoner. Yet here, the plaintiff class 
is a medically diverse group. Moreover, the violations for 
which damages are sought allegedly occurred over a span 
of years, during which the relevant medical standards may 
have changed. And, as we will discuss below, the 
defendants also vary, including both a lay supervisor and 
medical professionals. If this case ultimately goes forward 
as a class action for purposes of damages,3 the scope of the 
qualified immunity afforded each individual defendant 
should not be any different than it would be if that 
defendant were instead faced with separate damages 
actions filed on behalf of each member of the plaintiff class. 
Thus, if an individual damages actions by plaintiff P1 
against defendant D1 would not survive a motion for 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity, either 
because D1's alleged conduct did not constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation as to P1 or because the illegality of 
D1's conduct was not clearly established at the time in 
question, then in the class action context D1 should 
likewise be free from the burden of going to trial on the 
claims of P1 and all other similarly situated members of the 
plaintiff class. For these reasons, we remand to the District 
Court for it to consider the individual needs of each 
relevant subgroup of plaintiffs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The question of class certification for purposes of damages is not 
before us, and we express no opinion on this issue. 
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B. In light of the fact that we are remanding this case to 
the District Court to determine in the first instance whether 
relevant subclasses of plaintiffs have alleged violations of 
their Eighth Amendment rights, it would be premature for 
us to address the question whether, if such violations are 
ultimately found to have been alleged, the illegality of the 
defendants' conduct was clearly established. However, we 
emphasize that the District Court on remand should not 
only address the situation of each relevant category of 
plaintiffs, but it should also analyze separately the 
situation of each of the defendants who is sued for damages 
in an individual capacity. 
 
As previously noted, when a defendant asserts the 
defense of qualified immunity, it is necessary to determine 
whether a reasonable official in the position of that 
defendant would have known that his or her actions were 
unconstitutional in light of the clearly established law and 
the information the official possessed. See Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (determining whether 
it was objectively reasonable for an official to believe that a 
particular search was supported by probable cause requires 
consideration of the information possessed by the searching 
officials). In making this determination in this case, the 
District Court went astray in two respects. 
 
First, the District Court should have addressed the 
specific conduct of each of the individual defendants in 
determining whether that particular defendant acted in an 
"objectively unreasonable" manner. In Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996), we observed 
that the determination of whether a government official has 
acted in an objectively reasonable manner demands a 
highly individualized inquiry. We stated: 
 
       [T]he question is whether a reasonable public official 
       would know that his or her specific conduct violated 
       clearly established rights . . . . Thus, crucial to the 
       resolution of any assertion of qualified immunity is a 
       careful examination of the record . . . to establish, for 
       purposes of summary judgment, a detailed factual 
       description of the actions of each individual defendant 
       . . . . 
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Id. at 121-22 (emphasis in original); see also Reitz v. 
County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating 
that qualified immunity analysis "requires application of the 
law to the particular conduct at issue"); Bakalis v. 
Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Qualified 
immunity is an individual defense available to each 
individual defendant in his individual capacity."); Waldrop 
v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1989) (evaluating 
challenged conduct individually because deliberate 
indifference standard is fact-specific). 
 
In the present case, the District Court determined, 
without an individualized explanation, that all of the 
defendants (except Commissioner Fauver) had acted in an 
objectively unreasonable manner. The District Court simply 
stated that "[d]efendants knew what the appropriate level of 
care for a diabetic was and knew that the level of care 
provided was far short of it." Rouse I, 987 F. Supp. at 315. 
Nowhere in the District Court's opinion did it analyze the 
specific actions of each of the individual defendants. Nor is 
there any evidence in the record that allows us to make this 
determination on appeal. 
 
The need for an individualized analysis is apparent in 
this case because one of the individual defendants, the 
acting superintendent, is a lay administrative official. It is 
well-settled that liability under S 1983 may not be based on 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, see Durmer v. 
O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993), and there is 
nothing in the record or the District Court's opinion setting 
forth the basis for the conclusion that the acting 
superintendent should have known that his conduct 
constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. 
 
Second, the District Court should have considered the 
reasonableness of each of the defendants' actions with 
respect to each of the relevant categories of plaintiffs. The 
District Court stated: 
 
       [K]nowing that glucose is normally tested at the very 
       least once a day for patients like Plaintiffs, Defendants 
       could not have reasonably believed that glucose testing 
       in many cases less than twenty times a year for these 
       particular Plaintiffs was reasonable medical care . . . . 
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       Defendants could not . . . have reasonably thought that 
       Plaintiffs were among the group of insulin-dependent 
       diabetics who could tolerate such infrequent testing, 
       given . . . the substantial evidence of serious 
       fluctuations in the glucose levels of some of the 
       plaintiffs . . . . 
 
Rouse I, 987 F. Supp. at 315 (emphasis added) (emphasis 
in original omitted). As that paragraph demonstrates, the 
District Court recognized that not all of the plaintiffs are 
similarly situated but proceeded nevertheless to consider 
the plaintiffs' claim on a classwide basis. As discussed 
earlier, this analysis may have subjected some of the 
defendants to the possibility of personal liability even 
though the care they provided may have been 
constitutionally sufficient. 
 
Therefore, the District Court's determination that all of 
the defendants failed to act in an objectively reasonable 
manner in the care that they provided to all of the plaintiffs 
cannot stand. Accordingly, we remand to the District Court 
for it to determine whether each of the individual 
defendants acted in an objectively reasonable manner with 
respect to the particular needs of each relevant group of 
plaintiffs. 
 
III. 
 
For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the District 
Court and remand for the Court to reevaluate the qualified 
immunity issue in accordance with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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